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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (30 Jan 68) FOR OT RD-670772

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 196th
Light Infantry Brigade, Period Ending 31 July 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

**KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General**

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 196th Light Infantry Brigade

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196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP)
APO San Francisco 96256

OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

1 May 1967 - 31 July 1967

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

Prepared by:

OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE HISTORIAN

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Period 1 May 1967 - 31 July 1967

1. AR 1-19
2. AR 220-15
3. AR 870-5
4. USARV Reg 87-1
5. 196th Lt Inf Bde Reg 220-2
6. 196th Lt Inf Bde Reg 335-1
7. 196th Lt Inf Bde Reg 870-1
8. Map Sheets, South Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L-7014, Numbers:
 - a. 6640 III
 - b. 6638 I
 - c. 6639 I, II, & III
 - d. 6738 I & IV
 - e. 6739 I, II, III, & IV
 - f. 6838 IV
9. CPLAN 1-67 (OREGON) Hq, USARV
10. OPORD 1-67 (OREGON) Hq, 196th Lt Inf Bde
11. After Combat Interview Report, Company A, 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry, dated 26 June 1967
12. After Combat Interview Report, Company C, 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, dated 5 July 1967

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96256

AVRPHO

22 September 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 July 1967.
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Operational Report for Quarterly Period (RCS CSFOR-65)
Location: Vicinity, Chu Lai (BT550015), RVN
Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Frank H. Lannell
Prepared by: 2Lt Patrick A. Di Napoli, Brigade Staff Historian

1. Significant Organizational Activities:

a. Personnel and Administration:

(1) Personnel General:

(a) The infusion program was only moderately successful in overcoming the rotation hump which occurred during the period. Sixty-six percent of this brigade's authorized officer personnel and 58% of the enlisted personnel rotated during May-July 1967, and 83% of the brigade's key officer personnel rotated (15 out of 18), including all battalion commanders. This excessive key personnel turnover will be a primary area of concern in devising future infusion plans.

(b) Replacements:

1. Replacements received during the period were adequate. A total of 2396 personnel were received as against 2339 administrative losses. The brigade continues to be short artillery branch MOS NCOs, a USARV wide shortage. Command emphasis has been placed upon promotion of qualified personnel serving in NCO positions to include maximum utilization of the 2nd in-country promotion authority. The brigade receives many more allocations for promotion than there are eligible personnel. A total of 307 personnel were promoted to grade E-5 and E-6 out of an eligible 311; 762 allocations were received.

2. Replacements arriving at this command without records have created administrative problems throughout the period. During May-July 1967, 12 officers and 203 enlistedmen (9.1% of all replacements) reported to this station with no records. Initial assignments of these replacements were complicated by the fact that no record of their qualifications or experience was available, and many additional man hours were required to draw up temporary personnel and finance records. No inspector general complaints were initiated in this regard by the brigade, due to the finance sections

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rapid preparation of temporary pay records (within 20 days of arrival) so that undue hardship to personnel was avoided. A system is in effect whereby the AG transmits a tracer message to the appropriate overseas replacement station whenever an individual arrives without records.

3. During June and July, the brigade experienced great difficulty in receiving assignment instructions for departing personnel. Due to the difficulty of communicating with USARV on routine personnel matters, couriers to USARV were necessary to insure that some individuals departed by their DEROS. Procedures have been established by the AG to insure that the Advance Overseas Returnee rosters submitted by this command are completely accurate and are forwarded at the proper time.

(2) Personnel:

(a) Strength as of last day of report period. (organic and permanently attached).

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Auth	254	24	3733	4011
Asg	229	20	3888	4137
PDY	215	19	3714	3948

(b) Losses for the periods:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
KHA	1	0	30	31
WHA	11	0	229	240
MHA	1	0	0	1

(c) Gains for the periods:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
	178	14	2204	2396

(d) Key personnel gains:

<u>GRADE/NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>DATE ASSUMED</u>	<u>DATE ARRIVED</u>
EG LINNELL, Frank H.	Bde CG	20 May 67	1 May 67
LTC THOMAS, Jack D.	Bde XO	1 Aug 67	10 Jul 67
MAJ BIZZELLI, Word G.	Bde S-1	30 Jul 67	22 Oct 66
MAJ BERRY, Fred C., Jr.	Bde S-3	21 Jun 67	16 Feb 67
MAJ PUGMIRE, Robert M., Jr.	Bde S-5	24 Jun 67	22 Jun 67
CPT BATES, Joe B.	Bde Surg	16 Jun 67	9 Jun 67
MAJ BERREY, Thomas G.	Bde P.M.	31 Jul 67	29 Jul 67
CPT MORRIS, Charles T.	Bde Cml Off	30 Jun 67	28 Jun 67
MAJ PISKURA, Joseph H.	Bde Chap	24 Jul 67	2 Jul 66
MAJ SCOTT, Charles H.	Bde Sig Off	26 Jul 67	24 Jul 67

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Battalion CO's

<u>GRADE/NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>DATE ASSUMED</u> <u>POSITION</u>	<u>DATE ARRIVED</u> <u>IN-COUNTRY</u>
LTC HAMMOND, Lyman M., Jr.	CO, 8th Spt	15 Jul 67	9 Jul 67
LTC PALMER, Desmond D., Jr.	CO, 3/82d	8 Jul 67	5 Jul 67
LTC BRYAN, Louis C., Jr.	CO, 2/1st	19 May 67	15 Jul 66
LTC CHAMPLIN, Allen R.	CO, 3/21st	1 Aug 67	11 Jun 67
LTC SMITH, Charles R., Jr.	CO, 4/31st	11 May 67	12 Feb 67

(e) Awards and decorations approved: DFC 3, SS 15, LM 19, BSM 463, ARCOM 444, AM 227, SM 3.

(3) Administrative Services:

(a) Staff Judge Advocate:

1. Staff Judge Advocate activities increased nearly 100% over the previous three month period. Legal assistance cases rose from 130 in Feb-Apr 67 to 210 in May-Jul 67. Solatium payments increased from 5 to 54 and Courts Martial from 7 to 29.

2. Military Justice breakout: General CMs 3 referred and tried, Special CMs 20, Summary CMs 3.

3. Foreign National claims increased during the reporting period. In addition to Solatium Payments cited above, "Incident to Service Claims," rose to 4.

(4) Financial:

(a) General:

1. Personnel: Finance activities continued normally through the period. During the Jun-Jul rotation hump, in-processing point were established to process replacements expediently without disturbing normal operations. Approximately 4000 replacements and rotatees were processed. Emphasis was placed on preparing temporary pay records for replacements who arrived without records.

2. Equipment: Maintenance of the five adding-Subtracting machines authorized the finance section was a recurring problem. It is felt that the machines initially supplied (Victor, Premier, Model 61-85-54) are unable to withstand the excessive use, heat and humidity encountered in this area and would be better replaced with either a Remington-Rand or Friden machine of similar quality. A letter was sent to Field Service Division, Finance Center recommending that they stop procurement of these inadequate machines, and a request for replacement machines of the preferred type has been made through channels.

3. Total payments processed and made: 14,595

4. A count of pay complaints for the period was not kept, however pay complaints have not been the subject of any inspector general inquiry during the period, and have not been a problem.

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5. Travel pay, TDY etc., processed and paid: 1,348

(5) Chaplain activities:

(a) Religious services in the field and in base camps were the primary concern of the Chaplain's Section during the period. An assistant brigade chaplain is attached to each infantry battalion and to the support battalion. Periodic hospital visits are made by all brigade chaplains. The normal Character Guidance program was not feasible during the period, due to operational conditions, but a handout was prepared on the current monthly topic and distributed to the personnel in the brigade.

(b) Total services conducted and attendance:

1. Protestant: 243 - 4070
2. Catholic: 391 - 8015
3. Jewish: Service were conducted by Task Force Oregon.

(6) Discipline, Law and order:

(a) Military police operations continued normally throughout the period.

(b) Base camp operations:

1. Daily commitments are well within the capabilities of the military police detachment.

2. Indigenous personnel processed: 7200

3. The POW collection point used by the brigade is operated by TFO.

4. The exact number of convoy escorts for the period was not recorded; however, a log of missions was initiated on 1 August 1967 which will provide data for future reports.

5. Privately owned weapons are registered IAW MACV Directive 210-5.

6. Law and order: Non-traffic investigation: 113, traffic violations 28, CID cases 6, Motor vehicle accidents 2, Motor vehicle fatalities 0.

(c) Tactical Support:

1. Number of operations supported: 1.

2. Number of detainees processed: 565.

(7) Postal Services:

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(a) Postal operations continued normally throughout the period. An MTOE was submitted requesting a Type U Postal Unit for the brigade, which is consistent with current operations.

(b) Mail processed (pounds):

1. Received: 191,712
2. Dispatched: 78,859

(c) Total amount of Money Order sold: \$887,631.52

(d) Total amount of stamps sold: \$27,420.00

(8) Post Exchange Services:

(a) Gross sales for the quarter amounted to \$414,166.84. This is a large figure and is based on the initial supplies sent from Tay Ninh to Chu Lai base camp to have a large and varied inventory pending a transfer of accounting from the Saigon area to the Cam Ranh Bay area and the establishment of a permanent PX for this brigade. When the account was officially transferred, Task Force Oregon assumed accounting authority and battalion level PXs were initiated directly under Task Force Oregon. Their sales are increasing monthly, therefore the amount on future reports will be lower based on the above.

(b) During the month of August a new PX warehouse is planned for construction, allowing for expansion of the present PX. A pick-up point for the TFC PX Korean laundry concession for the brigade base camp area is to be added during August also. A PX mobile barber shop is due-in during the month of August, replacing the inadequate barber facilities now in existence in the cantonment area of brigade headquarters.

(9) Special Services Activities:

(a) Since moving to the Chu Lai Area, facilities have been constructed at an approved beach area which is available to all units of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. This has proven to be a good morale builder as well as a convenient recreation area.

(b) There have been two USO shows:

1. Floyd Patterson, 28 June 1967, attendance: 300
2. Sammy Spear Show, 24 July 1967, attendance: 1000

(c) Number of R&Rs:

1. In-Country: Vung Tau (May-Jun): 170, China Beach (Jul): 85
2. Out of Country: Via Saigon (May-Jun): 1371, Via Da Nang (Jul): 686

(d) There have been 828 film showings.

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b. Operations:

(1) During the period 1 May 31 July there were 213 major operations of company/troop or larger size, and 9499 operations conducted by platoons or less. Of these, 68 major and 267 minor operations resulted in enemy contact.

(2) Operation OREGON:

(a) Inclusive dates: 7 April - continuing

(b) Task Organizations:

1. 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry
2. 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry
3. 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry
4. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry
5. 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
6. 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery
7. 8th Support Battalion
8. Headquarters and Headquarters Company
9. 175th Engineer Company
10. "F" Troop, 17th Cavalry
11. B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery
12. 48th Infantry Platoon, Scout Dog
13. 156th Signal Platoon
14. Platoon B Company, 3rd Amtrac Battalion
15. 10th Public Information Detachment
16. 569th Military Intelligence Detachment
17. 636th Military Intelligence Detachment (Order of Battle)
18. Brigade Aviation Section
19. 27th Chemical Detachment

(c) Directing Authority: The participation of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade in this Operation was directed by CONUS MACV.

(d) Location: See Tab "A"

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(e) Type operation: The Brigade is assigned the mission of securing the Chu Lai airfield and administrative complex, of providing a shield for Revolutionary Development within the TAOR, and of conducting combat operations within the TAOR and without it as directed.

(f) Personnel and equipment losses: A statistical summary of friendly personnel losses can be found in paragraph (2)(b) of this report, as submitted by the S1. A statistical summary of enemy personnel and equipment losses can be found in paragraph c(1)(c) of this report as submitted by S2.

(3) Artillery:

(a) Missions fired/rounds expended:

	<u>H&I Mission</u>	<u>H&I Rounds</u>	<u>105 Spt Mission</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>SPT RDS</u> <u>III</u>	<u>WP</u>
May	5736	9461	643	11641	718	1199
Jun	7195	10914	845	8685	879	648
Jul	7670	13686	1031	8586	1168	1092

(b) Results:

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. VC KIA (BC)	49	13	16	78
2. VC KIA (POSS)	65	36	68	169
3. Structures destroyed	42	27	36	105
4. Bunkers destroyed	18	1	10	29
5. Secondary fires	3	2	1	6
6. Secondary explosions	4	4	3	11
7. Sampans destroyed	30	0	0	30

(4) Air Support:

(a) Sorties flown:

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. Preplans	71	77	80	228
2. Skyspots	21	1	19	41
3. Immediates	29	22	17	68
4. Diverted flights	16	4	6	16
5. O1 VR Mission	156	125	152	433
6. O1 FAC Mission	84	74	84	242

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(b) Results:

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. VC KIA (BC)	47	13	39	99
2. VC KIA (POSS)	51	46	57	154
3. Structures Dest.	128	193	252	573
4. Bunkers Destroyed	66	40	28	134
5. Secondary fires	12	13	10	35
6. Secondary explosions	25	9	10	44
7. Sampans destroyed	0	0	0	0

(5) Scout Dog Platoon: During the reporting period, the assigned strength of the platoon was 1 officer, 19 enlistedmen, and 23 dogs. The platoon took part in 228 operations, in which 24 resulted in enemy contacts. Three handlers were WHA, one handler was KHA, and two dogs were KHA during the reporting period. As a result of Scout dog employment, a large number of booby traps, mines, and tunnels were located and 3 VC were captured. This platoon operates on a continuous training cycle for both handlers and dogs. During the reporting period, 5 soldiers MOS 11B10 were trained by the platoon as Scout Dog Handlers.

(6) Training and Organization:

(a) The overall training status of the Brigade remains excellent. Upon reporting to the Brigade each enlisted man attends a six day orientation course. Officers attend a three day orientation course. This course, conducted by the Charger Academy, consists of a review of basic combat skills with special emphasis on the detection of mines and booby traps, patrolling, and individual weapons. (See Tab "C")

(b) During the reporting period, a total of 2222 enlistedmen and 183 officers completed indoctrination training at the Charger Academy. The Charger Academy trained a total of forty enlisted soldiers as snipers during the reporting period. Sniper school consisted of 6 days of training with emphasis placed on concept of employment of sniper teams and techniques of fire. Twenty men were trained on 1-7 May and an additional twenty on 8-15 May. (See Tab "D")

(c) Significant MTOE/Organizational Changes:

1. MTOE: None; MTOEs for all Brigade units were being prepared during reporting period and will be completed in the next period.

2. Organizational: Under the authority of message USARV/AVHGC-FD, dated 240615Z, Subject: Mechanization of Cavalry Troop (U), F Troop, 17th Cavalry was reorganized from TOE 17-117T to TOE 17-57G as an Armored Cavalry Troop (Mechanized). While the troop has been issued the majority of the equipment authorized by TOE 17-57G, there has been no General Order published organizing the troop under this TOE and, at this time, the change is organizational in nature. (See Tab "B" (Organization))

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c. Intelligence:

(1) General:

(a) Throughout the reporting period the one local force battalion, the six local forces companies, and the one main force company which are located in the Brigade TAOR and immediate adjacent areas generally avoided large scale contacts with the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. There was no known contact with either the 2nd or 3rd NVA Divisions which were located generally to the north and south of the Brigade TAOR. On only one occasion, did the Viet Cong elect to commit company or larger size elements against Brigade units in operations involving fire and maneuver. There were ten contacts with platoon and platoon minus size elements. Contacts with squads and reinforced squads were more commonplace. There were no significant mortar attacks conducted against Brigade units. One attack wherein the enemy expended approximately 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire was conducted against the neighboring Chu Lai Defense Command. Approximately 50% of the significant VC initiated incidents took place during the month of May. As Brigade operations increased, the initiative of the Viet Cong was apparently lost.

(b) Enemy activities were generally confined to guerrilla type activities including harassing fires, emplacement of mines and booby traps along roads, trails, and other likely avenues of approach. During the reporting period there were a total of 491 Viet Cong initiated incidents, including 257 incidents of harassing fire and 90 incidents of aircraft receiving small arms or automatic weapons fire. A total of 46 incidents occurred where enemy emplaced mines resulted in US casualties and/or damage/destruction of equipment. Approximately 129 mines were recovered. There were 45 incidents of booby traps causing casualties to Brigade personnel and a total of 97 booby traps devices were recovered. Casualties caused by mines and booby traps remained at approximately the same level throughout the period; however, the number of these devices discovered before detonation increased sharply during the month of June and remained at a high level during the month of July.

(c) Viet Cong personnel and equipment losses for the period were:

1. VC KIA (BC): 448
2. VC KIA (POSS): 508
3. VC POW: 12
4. Small arms and Crew served weapons: 61
5. Grain and rice: 29
6. Returnee: 3
2. VC Base camp discovered: 5, Destroyed: 1

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(2) Significant VC Initiated Incidents:

(a) On 011045H May 67, A 4/31 Inf observed four VC armed with M-14 rifles coming from Tuyot Diem (4) Hamlet (BT651019). The VC opened fire at a distance of approximately 400 meters with an estimated 200 rounds of small arms fire. Fire was returned with 500 rounds of M-16, resulting in the wounding of one VC who was later captured.

(b) On 011320H May 67, 15-20 VC engaged a platoon of B 4/31 Inf. The VC opened fire with small arms and automatic weapons firing from a woodline on the left flank of the friendly unit. Simultaneously, an est. 20-30 additional VC opened fire from a Hamlet on the woodline vic. (BS643966). The VC also expended five rounds of 57mm RR from a north easterly direction, possibly vic. (BS677694). The US unit returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons. Armed helicopters and artillery supported the US ground forces. The result of friendly fire was not determined.

(c) On 030747H May 1967, the CP and D 4/31 Inf received 20-30 rounds of automatic weapons fire the vicinity of (BS642977). Fire was returned with small arms and artillery. Armed helicopters supported the ground forces. After cease fire took place, a platoon searched the enemy location and found two dead VC. Two US M-1 carbines were captured, along with miscellaneous web gear. No enemy unit identification was made.

(d) On 050830H May 67, an undetermined number of VC engaged A 1/14 Inf. Five rounds of small arms fire was initially received from a distance of 300 meters southwest of the company position at (BT341109). US forces pursued the VC and encountered sporadic fire throughout the pursuit. Upon reaching the vicinity of (BT341106), they received a heavy volume of automatic weapons and machine gun fire from the west, south and east. VC forces at this location were estimated to be at least a reinforced squad. Three air-strikes were placed on the enemy locations resulting in five VC confirmed killed and five more possibly killed. Artillery was also employed in support of A 1/14 Inf. After contact was broken at 050849 May 67, a search was made and four additional VC dead were located who had been killed by either shrapnel or small arms fire. During the search, one wounded VC was apprehended, however, he was killed while attempting to escape. No unit identification was made.

(e) On 051407H May 67, D 4/31 Inf was engaged by an estimated VC platoon in the vicinity of (BS629975). The VC opened fire with small arms and automatic weapons, expended an estimated 500 rounds. Six rounds of either M79 or 60mm mortar were also expended by the enemy. Fire was returned with 500 rounds of small arms fire. Armed helicopters assaulted the enemy locations, and an air strike was also placed on the VC positions. Contact was terminated at 1445 hrs. Enemy casualties were three confirmed killed and four possibly killed. No enemy unit identification was made.

(f) On 060830H May 67, 20-30 VC engaged A 1/14 Inf in the vicinity of (BT337101). The VC opened fire with automatic weapons at a distance of approximately 500 meters northwest, west and southwest of the US forces positions. An artillery mission was fired on the enemy positions and contact was lost at 0849 hrs. A 1/14 Inf pursued the VC and re-established contact at 0914 hrs. with an estimated 20-30 VC in the vicinity of (BT334104) when the VC again employed automatic weapons. Ground forces returned fire, artillery fired in support and air strike were placed on the enemy positions. Contact was broken following the airstrikes and it was determined that the VC had sustained seven confirmed killed and 12 more possibly killed.

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(g) On 100123H May 67, C 1/14 Inf received 6-10 rounds of estimated 60mm mortar fire into their positions vicinity of (BT301141). Fire is believed to have emanated from the vicinity of (BT2912). Artillery fire mission was placed on this location. The mortar fire terminated. Further results of friendly fire were not determined.

(h) Between 130118H May 67, an unknown size VC force conducted a mortar attack on sub-sector I of the Chu Lai Defense Command, expending an estimated 32-40 82mm mortar rounds and three 57mm RR rounds. Armed helicopters and flareships were placed on station. Flares were dropped until 130320H May 67; however, no sightings of the enemy were made. In following investigation, mortar positions were located at (BT516122). Thirteen canisters for 57mm RR rounds and two 57mm RR rounds were found. Evidence that approximately 40 82mm rounds had been fired was also discovered.

(i) On 141814H May 67, 3rd platoon, B 1/14 Inf received 6-10 rounds of sniper fire into its location at (BT330695). Fire came from the northwest of their position at a distance of approximately 200 meters. Part of the platoon laid down a base of fire with M-16 and M-60, and began a pursuit operation. The remainder of the platoon rapidly maneuvered to the rear of the enemy location, and surprised eight VC who were leaving a small hut. The maneuvering element engaged the VC at a distance of 50 meters, killing all eight and capturing three BAR's, three Soviet carbines, one US carbine, four AT mines, two rifle grenade launchers, approximately 7,000 rounds small arms ammunition. In addition three US air mattresses, miscellaneous documents, three documents, three 60mm mortar rounds, a ten pound shaped-charge, nine pounds of C-4, thirty Chicom grenades, two US trip flares and seven water cans were found.

(j) 170330-170400H May 67, an estimated reinforced VC platoon or company minus attacked CAP L-11 and RD 11 at Phu Le (1) hamlet vic. (BS578936), expending over 100 rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire, approximately 15 rifle grenades and an estimated five M-79 rounds. The enemy engaged at a distance of approximately 200-300 meters to the northwest of the friendly location. Friendly elements countered with a heavy volume of M-79 and small arms fire, resulting in one VC body count and five more possible. Enemy equipment losses consisted of: one RPG-2, two rounds of RPG-2 ammo, two satchel charges, two homemade grenades, and one homemade mine. Identification of the unit was not made.

(k) On 170407H May 67, the first and third platoons of B 1/14 Inf were engaged by estimated VC squad size element vic. (BT277130) and (BT274124). In each instance the enemy employed small arms fire and rifle grenades. Fire was returned with small arms and artillery. Flareships and armed helicopters were dispatched to the area. The flareships received fire as they flew over the area. Armed helicopters assaulted the enemy locations silencing the hostile fire. The VC broke contact at 0420 hrs. Subsequent search of the area resulted in the finding of five enemy dead and the capture of one AK 47 assault rifle. At 0745 hrs, while the search was continuing, the search party received an estimated 30 rounds of small arms fire and 12 hand grenades. Fire was returned with 250 rounds of small arms fire and artillery fired in support with 35 rounds of 155mm HE. This fire resulted in four more confirmed VC dead and two possibly dead. Documents captured indicated the enemy unit to be the 70th company of the 409th sapper Bn.

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(1) On 191045H May 67, G 2/11 AC at (BS828897) received 100 rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire from approximately 400 meters southwest of their position. Fire was returned with 10 M-79 rounds, 300 .50 caliber machine gun rounds and 400 M-16 rounds. At 1105 hrs. they received additional small arms and automatic weapons fire, and several rifle grenades from 200 meters southwest of their location at (BS725887). G 2/11 AC responded with 10 rounds of M-79 fire, 200 rounds of .50 cal. machine gun fire, and 250 rounds of M-60 fire. At this time 15 VC wearing blue uniforms and web gear were observed running into a woodline 400 meters south of their location. An artillery mission of two rounds of 105mm WP and 138 rounds of 105mm HE were placed on the woodline. Armed helicopters assaulted the area and airstrikes were placed on the enemy location. Friendly reaction resulted in eight confirmed VC killed. At 1305 hrs, G 2/11 AC then located at (BS735891) received 30-40 rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire from 500 meters southeast of their position. Approximately 300 rounds of 7.62mm and .50 cal machine gun rounds were fired in response, after which the enemy withdrew. Friendly units pursued until 1415 hrs, when they received 2-3 rounds of small arms fire from a hay stack vic. (BS739883). Fifty rounds of M-60 machine gun were fired in response resulting in one VC confirmed killed. Contact was lost following this engagement. The enemy unit involved was not identified.

(m) On 220845H May 67, C 3/21 Inf operating in conjunction with G 2/11 AC received 150-250 rounds of small arms and automatic weapon fire from an estimated two VC squads. Fire estimated from approximately 500 meters south of friendly positions at (BS744863). Friendly elements responded with 1000 rounds of M-60 fire, 500 rounds of .50 cal. machine gun fire, 800 rounds of M-16 fire, and 15 rounds of M-79 fire. The VC broke contact at 0900 hrs, and were last seen in vic. (BS743860). At 1210 hrs, C 3/21 Inf received heavy automatic weapons and small arms fire from 400 meters southwest at (BS742852). Fire was returned with small arms and automatic weapons. C Co continued to receive sporadic fire until 1300 hrs. Twenty rounds of M-79, 500 rounds of M-16, and 500 rounds of .50 cal. machine gun were fired in response. At 1400 hrs, G 2/11 AC observed nine VC running northwest at a distance of 250 meters from (BS738852). The unit engaged the VC with 300 rounds of .50 cal. MG fire and 600 rounds of M-60 fire, resulting in three confirmed enemy killed and one captured. At 1405 hrs, C 3/21 Inf observed five VC dressed in black PJ's 300 meters southeast at (BS742852). The friendly unit engaged the VC with 300 rounds of M-16 fire and eight rounds of M-79 fire resulting in three enemy confirmed killed. At 1640 hrs, G 2/11 AC received 4 rounds of small arms fire from an estimated six VC located 300 meters north of the friendly position. During a check of the area from which the enemy fire emanated, a second VC force was observed, 300 meters to the north. The unit engaged with 60 rounds of M-60 fire resulting in one VC confirmed killed. No unit identification was made on any of the units involved.

(n) On 230350H May 67, an estimated two VC companies surrounded and attacked C/11 patrol, C 4/31 Inf in vicinity (BS700955). The VC initiated incident by detonating claymore mines and satchel charges, and firing rifle grenades and 57mm RR. The VC did not employ automatic weapons and small arms fire until they reached the friendly patrol's bunker line and trench system, at which time extensive use of these weapons and hand grenades was made. Friendly elements returned fire with small arms, M-60 machine guns, M-79 grenade launchers, M-26 grenades, claymore mines, and 81mm mortars.

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Armed helicopters supported the ground forces. The VC broke contact at 0420 hrs, after sustaining 7 confirmed killed, 17 possibly killed, and the loss of one MAT 49 sub-machine gun, 40 grenades, one Thompson sub-machine gun and 3.57mmRR rounds. Small arms and automatic weapons employed by the VC included; M-1 carbines, M-1 rifle, sub-machine guns, .30 cal. machine guns and .50 cal. machine guns.

(o) 10115H June 1967, E 2/11 AC at vic (BS493898) received 200-300 rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated 15 VC. Friendly forces returned fire with 15 rounds of 90mm HE, 20 rounds of 90mm cannister, 1,000 rounds of .50 cal. machinegun, and 1,500 rounds of 7.62mm machine gun fire. The VC immediately broke contact and fled west and northwest. A search was made of the enemy location with negative results. No identification of the enemy unit was made.

(p) 121220H June 1967, patrol A-8, 2/1 Inf located (BT444023) received approximately 150-200 rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated VC squad located 500 meters northwest of the friendly positions. Patrol A-7 was dispatched to assist patrol A-8. The relief patrol received small arms fire from an estimated 5 VC at (BT446020). Patrols returned fire with 40 rounds of M-79, 300 rounds of M-16, 300 rounds of M-14, and 900 rounds of M-60. Artillery was fired in to the area. Armed helicopters and airstrikes supported ground forces.

(q) On 191607H June 1967, 5 VC (BT357073) opened fire with small arms on 2nd platoon, C 1/4 Inf at a distance of approximately 50 meters. Fire was returned with M-16, M-60 machine guns, and M-79. The fire fight lasted approximately five minutes and resulted in two confirmed VC killed and one more possibly killed. One Chicom sub-machine gun and 125 rounds of small arms ammo were captured. No identification was made of the enemy unit.

(r) On 26096H June 1967, an unknown number of VC engaged B 1/14 Inf vic (BT342057). The enemy opened fire with small arms and automatic weapons, expending between 50-60 rounds, at a distance of 300 meters. Fire was returned with M-16, M-14, and M-79. Armed helicopters assaulted the enemy locations. An artillery mission was fired in support. Subsequent to the action, ground forces assaulted the area with negative results. No identification of the enemy unit was made.

(s) On 272105H June 1967 an estimated 50-70 VC attacked CAP L-4 positions in vicinity (BT622012). The VC opened fire with small arms and automatic weapons at a distance of approximately 100-150 meters north of the CAP locations. Enemy fire increased in intensity until a penetration of the CAP perimeter was attempted. The CAP forces responded with all available small arms and automatic weapons and were successful in repelling the enemy attack. The VC broke contact at 2120 hours and fled north. Armed helicopters were requested, however, contact was terminated before they reached the area. A search of the area was conducted with negative results.

(t) On 061408H July 1967, an estimated 20-30 VC fired on VR aircraft in vicinity of (BS632960) with a heavy volume of small arms fire. Artillery mission fired on the area and armed helicopters assaulted the

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enemy position. Prior to directing an air strike, a FAC aircraft which arrived in the area after the initial enemy round was fired received automatic weapons fire. An air strike was placed on the enemy locations. Friendly action resulted in 17 confirmed VC killed and two possible killed. Four bunkers were destroyed and six tunnels were caved-in.

(u) On 021017H July 1967, A-6 patrol vic (BT442043), 2/1 Inf received small arms and automatic weapons fire from approximately 200 meters to the north. The patrol returned fire with 100 rounds M-60, 20 rounds M-16, 5 rounds M-79, and 5 rounds 81mm mortar. The patrol conducted a search of the suspected enemy positions and at 1240 hours received estimated 400 rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire from three enemy positions 200-300 meters to their northeast. Fire was again returned with small arms automatic weapons and M-79. Armed helicopters assaulted the enemy positions. The VC broke contact. A search of these enemy positions was concluded with negative results.

(v) On 121930H July 1967, the assault platoon, 1/14 Inf while moving to its night position vic (BT317124) received a heavy volume of fire from an estimated 10 automatic weapons 100-150 meters to their northeast. Fire was returned with automatic weapons and small arms. Artillery was fired in support. Contact was broken after approximately five minutes.

(w) On 14085H July 1967, an estimated 4-5 VC placed small arms and automatic weapons fire into the 196th Bde Hq area; Firing from a ridgeline vic (BT554003). Fire was returned with small arms, automatic weapons, machine-guns, M-79 and 106mm RR fire. Contact was broken at approximately 0935 hours. A subsequent search of area by F/17 CAV located a possible mortar position vic (BT549004).

(x) On 151131H July 1967, 3rd platoon C 1/14 Inf vic (BT328109) received small arms and automatic weapons fire from three different locations 300 meters to their southeast. Fire was returned with 20 rounds of M-79, 60 rounds of M-14, and 50 rounds of M-16. Artillery fired in support. One VC was observed to fall into a rice paddy. The second squad attempted to recover the body and received six rounds of small arms fire from 150 meters to the south. Fire was returned with small arms and automatic weapons fire. Search of the area subsequent to the termination of the action revealed one confirmed killed and evidence of three possibly killed. No enemy unit identification was made.

(y) On 160655H July 1967, the CP C 4/31 Inf vic (BS 658954) received an estimated 600-700 round of small and automatic weapons fire and either rifle grenades or mortar fire from the vic (658958, BS651960, and BS658957). Fire was returned with small arms and automatic weapons. Artillery fired in support. The VC broke contact at 0710 hrs.

(z) On 231028H July 1967, the 3rd squad, 3rd platoon, B 1/14 Inf vic (BT278134) received 100-150 rounds automatic weapons fire from 200 meters south of their location from an estimated 4-5 weapons. The 3rd platoon returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons, called in an artillery mission and began to maneuver. While maneuvering, the unit received estimated 40 rounds of small arms fire from 150 meters south.

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Artillery fired 234 rounds of 105mm HE and 39 rounds 155mm HE; resulting in eight VC possibly killed. Two airstrikes were placed on enemy positions resulting in the destruction of six structures. The area was subsequently swept, during which traces of blood and bits of pineapple were found.

(3) Weather generally favored friendly operations throughout the period, with high temperatures being the only detriment. Temperature generally ranged from 73 degrees to 96 degrees; however individual highs of 105 degrees and above were often attained. Relative humidities averaged 93% morning hours and 55% during afternoon hours. Rainfall was light and limited to brief showers during the late afternoon and early evening hours. Cloud cover was light and did not generally prohibit air support ~~at~~ the collection of intelligence information by airborne sensors. Ground haze and fog was practically nonexistent.

(4) Terrain in the area consist of coastal plains and isolated hills generally dry except in paddy area where it remains moist. The road network in the area is adequate; however, the numerous streams and paddy lands restrict cross-country travel throughout the TAOR. Except in isolated areas in the extreme western portion of the TAOR where in the hill and mountains there is dense vegetation, aerial observation is excellent. In these areas of dense vegetation, aerial observation is limited due to the natural concealment. Ground observation and fields of fire vary from excellent to unsatisfactory depending on terrain contours, hedgerows, the small hillocks and many gullies which are characteristic of the area.

(5) During the period 29 checkmate operations were completed. Approximately 8,682 persons were screened, and 161 were detained as civil defendants.

(6) Long Range Reconnaissance Detachment Activities during the period under discussion: The LRRP Det undertook 21 separate missions. All were unilateral Army mission in support of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade Operations.. At this time there were no missions conducted in coordination with US Marine Corps. Specifics of mission conducted in support of the 196th Lt Inf Bde Operations as extracted from the patrol reports are as follows:

(a) DATE: 13 May 67

LOCATION: Vic of (BS456954)

TYPE MISSION: Ground Reconnaissance

RESULTS: LRRP found platoon size OP consisting of 9 foxholes (4X3X3) covering avenues of approach to hilltop. LRRP found papers from 3rd Bde, 25th Inf Div dated 15 April 67. Also copies of the Stars and Stripes same date, 2 copies of Army Reporter. LRRP had no contact with enemy and no friendly casualties.

(b) DATE: 13 May 67

LOCATION: Vic of (BT376067)

TYPE MISSION: OP

RESULTS: Observed Huey Helicopter go down, Coord (BT376067). Helicopter didn't appear to be in trouble. LRRP had no friendly casualties.

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(c) DATE: 17 May 67

LOCATION: Vic of (BT3599-0449)

TYPE MISSION: Ground Reconnaissance

RESULTS: 18th May, 0700H, LRRP heard lot of firing, could not locate because of low terrain, heard sporadic firing during day north of hill 371 (BT3505). 1700H, heard firing at (BT34900560). LRRP saw flares over valley (BT3505). 19th May LRRP heard short bursts of machine-gun fire (BT361065) checked LZ for extraction and observed 8 personnel move between themselves and the LZ 25 to 40 meters away, dressed in black and grey clothes, no head gear, carrying 3 weapons: 2 US carbines, 1 foreign type (BT35650610). The enemy started to circle and point man saw 3 people in hedgerow (BT 35650610). LRRP called gunships they arrived and fired into the enemy area, right on target. LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(d) DATE: 20 May 67

LOCATION: Vic of (BS488968)

TYPE MISSION: Ground Reconnaissance

RESULTS: 22 May 2130H, LRRP heard voices about 200 meters away (BS488968) observed flashlights at (BS481967). LRRP called artillery and gunships, no body count. 22 May 2220H, LRRP observed Mortar flashes at (BS 520955) 15-20 rounds. 23 May 2100H, LRRP observed mortar flashes at (BS478978). LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(e) DATE: 24 May 67

LOCATION: Vic of (BS451963)

TYPE MISSION: Ground Reconnaissance

RESULTS: 1815H, 27 May 67 LRRP observed 8 VC (BS442926) 150-200 meters going north, wearing brown shirts and shorts. The rest had on black PJ's. 7 weapons were seen but could not be recognized. 1830H, LRRP observed 3 VC wearing black PJ's going northwest (BS442924), called gunships and directed at the VC, no body count. LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(f) DATE: 24 May 67

LOCATION: Vic of (BS451963)

TYPE MISSION: Ground Reconnaissance

RESULTS: 25 May 0845H, trail running North-northwest and 2 cache areas (BS4500-9585). LRRP found cave with air vents at (BS4560-9565), used trail was found in the same location. LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(g) DATE: 27 May 67

LOCATION: Vic of (BS442926)

TYPE MISSION: Ground Reconnaissance

RESULTS: 1845H, 27 May 67 LRRP observed 8 VC (BS442926) 150-200 meters going north, wearing brown shirts and shorts. The rest had on black PJ's. Seven weapons were seen but could not be recognized. 1830H, LRRP observed 3 VC wearing black PJ's going northwest (BS442924), called gunships and directed at the VC, no body count. LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(h) DATE: 30 May 67

LOCATION: Vic of (BT350050)

TYPE MISSION: OP

RESULTS: Negative contact and no friendly casualties.

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(i) DATE: 2 June 67
LOCATION: Vic (BS442926)
TYPE MISSION: Ground Reconnaissance
RESULTS: LRRP observed 8 VC (BS442926) and 3 VC at (BS442924) called gunships and struck the first VC group spotted, no body count. Moved north and heard 2 to 10 VC. LRRP observed large and well used trail (BS456915). LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(j) DATE: 3 June 67
LOCATION: Vic of (BT311111)
TYPE MISSION: Ground Reconnaissance
RESULTS: At 0845H, LRRP observed 2 VC walking up hill 50-75 meters from them, wearing black shorts and dirty white shirts, noticed one BAR and 1 M-1 or Mauser. LRRP called Arty and at this time observed 6 more VC but saw no weapons, LRRP fired and they ran due west. Gunships arrived and drew enemy fire from (BT311117). Gunships were on target but continued to receive fire, at same time heard heavy weapons firing at (BT311117). LRRP called air strike at (BT311117); jets hit target and silenced machine gun. Immediately after air strike, observed movement at (BT313109), VC probing position from there. LRRP called Arty and Gunships; after gunships made sweep, one of us fired at 2 running VC, hitting one. LRRP observed the other dragging the dead away but was unable to cut him down. During this time heard numerous moans and painful yelling; LRRP called 24 more rounds of Arty and silenced the moaning. LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(k) DATE: 3 Jun 67
LOCATION: Vic of (BT338137)
TYPE MISSION: Ground Reconnaissance
RESULTS: LRRP observed 46 VC with weapons vic of (BT338137) and (BT325132) LRRP received sniper fire at (BT325132), (BT340142), and (BT333139). Enemy forces KIA 4 confirmed, 1 poss. at (BT338137) 2 KIA and 1 poss. at (BT350104) 2 KIA. LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(l) DATE: 5 Jun 67
LOCATION: Vic of (BT487948)
TYPE MISSION: Area Recon
RESULTS: LRRP observed 12 VC vic (BT487948). Called Arty. All were dressed in black PJ's. They appeared to be carrying AK 47's. Also observed a F-100 crash vic (BT479942), seven helicopters landed in same area. Observed 8 VC vic (BT485948), called Arty. LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(m) DATE: 10 Jun 67
LOCATION: Vic of (BT385119)
TYPE MISSION: OP
RESULTS: This patrol covered a period of 3 days with sightings of civilian workers in field vic (BT3811), two VC foxholes vic (BT384103). LRRP observed flashlights at vic (BT387119). No friendly casualties.

(n) DATE: 15 Jun 67
LOCATION: Vic of (BT48308880)
TYPE MISSION: Area Recon
RESULTS: 1030H 12 June 67, LRRP observed 1 VC (BS830888)

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with field gear, wearing black PJ's, no weapon. LRRP received two rounds of M-79 30 meters from position. FAC spotted 6 people with weapons (BS480884). FAC drew sniper fire, both semi and automatic fire. Called Arty on house (BS48108870). LRRP observed people enter house carrying weapons. Heard crying and screaming. Arty killed 8 people. LRRP also called Arty on 6 VC in open; hit dead center resulting in 6 KIA possible, no body count. LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(o) DATE: 26 Jun 67
LOCATION: Vic of (BT476145)
TYPE MISSION: Area Recon
RESULTS: This patrol covered a period of 43 hrs with

no sightings. No friendly casualties.

(p) DATE: 3 Jul 67
LOCATION: Vic of (BT323110)
TYPE MISSION: Area Recon
RESULTS: 4 Jul 67 LRRP found church at (BT325100)
in same general area found 2 man bunker. Complex was 15 to 20 feet long at (BT323110). Heavily booby trapped area (BT312110) and (BT314110). Sgt Franklin Williams stepped on mine; only firing device went off. LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(q) DATE: 9 Jul 67
LOCATION: Vic of (BT369006)
TYPE MISSION: Area Recon
RESULTS: 9 Jul 67 found grave site at (BT36800140).
Observed personnel moving and called in Arty; heard secondary explosion. LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(r) DATE: 11 Jul 67
LOCATION: (BS48909660)
TYPE MISSION: OP
RESULTS: 11 Jul 67 location (BS48909660) at 1615 hours
LRRP saw 3 VC moving west, black PJ's, with helmets and unidentified weapons. 12 Jul 67 1400 hours observed air strike by Marine plane (BS468942). Air strike at (BS512981) by US jets. Observed Infantry moving west (BS512981). LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(s) DATE: 15 Jul 67
LOCATION: (432103)
TYPE MISSION: OP
RESULTS: LRRP was inserted at coordinates (BT432103),
15 Jul 67. LRRP observed one VC moving 25 meters from friendly position, wearing khaki uniform with matching hat and carrying carbine. 16 Jul 67, LRRP observed 4 VC smoking marijuana about 30 meters from friendly position. LRRP called arty, got excellent target coverage. LRRP heard movement in area until 0900H, 17 Jul 67, LRRP returned to base. LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(t) DATE: 20 Jul 67
LOCATION: (BT415915)
TYPE MISSION: GROUND RECONNAISSANCE
RESULTS: LRRP entered area (BT412906) at 2109H; two men were hurt initial lift, SP4 Crosby (patrol leader) and SP4 Stevens. SP5 Layton was

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inserted as patrol leader. LRRP found homemade firing range; targets had holes in them. At approximately 1300 the LRRP observed approximately 18 people from (BT417908) on an azimuth of 180 degrees. LRRP moved out on an azimuth of 360 degrees for about 175 meters when point man PFC Boyd made visual contact with 5 people dressed in black PJ's. They ran to a big boulder; LRRP followed them. Found a big cave and next to it, on stilts a four room hootch located at (BT217910), heard noises inside and threw a grenade. LRRP discovered several tunnels, also noises to their front. PFC Boyd spotted a fleeing VC, shot and killed him. Saw movement to east, west and north. Moved back to original position (BT415915) and started to receive small arms fire, at least 30 rounds. At approximately 1645 hours called chopper who came and provided air cover. The fire was coming in at an azimuth of 360 degrees. At 1830 hours LRRP was extracted; at 1845 hours LRRP was debriefed by the S2 Office.

(u) DATE: 20 Jul 67
LOCATION: (BS4595)
TYPE MISSION: OP

RESULTS: Acted as radio relay for LRRP patrol TR42, also observed valley (BS4796) and (BS441595). LRRP had no sightings, no friendly casualties.

(v) DATE AND TIME: 0800H, 21 July to 24 Jul 67
MISSION: OP
LOCATION: (BS4595)

RESULTS: Conducted Radio Relay for (Cathy). Observed valley vic (BS4494) and (BS4796). LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(w) DATE AND TIME: 0800H, 23 Jul 67
RESULTS: Cancelled

(x) DATE AND TIME: 1000H, 24 Jul 0800H, 27 Jul 67
MISSION: Conduct Area Reconnaissance
RESULTS: Line company dropped LRRP off at (BT472903).

LRRP heard movement at (BT4665-9035). Lost commo from 1800H to 2300H on 25 Jul. LRRP heard voices and movement at (BT4653-8998) also heard metal banging at same location. LRRP called artillery, heard people screaming and yelling and secondary explosion. Saw light's to east and called artillery. Heard metal again at (BT464903); lost commo. At (BT465905) LRRP observed one VC moving toward friendly position commo was still out. LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(y) DATE AND TIME: 1500H, 27 Jul to 1700H, 30 Jul 67.
MISSION: Conduct of OP
LOCATION: (BS325158)

RESULTS: LRRP observed air strike at (BS284139); no other observations; LRRP had no friendly casualties.

(z) DATE AND TIME: 0700H, 31 Jul to 0730H, 3 Aug 67
MISSION: Conduct Area Reconnaissance
LOCATION: Vic of (BT4402-4602-4400-4600)
RESULTS: Line company dropped LRRP off at (BT462029).

At (BT456009) LRRP observed 12 people, black PJ's, 1 with BAR stopped at (BT 453018) because of civilian people in the area. LRRP stayed in this same location for 5 hours. LRRP observed movement at 2100 hours at (BT446014);

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also kill 707 observed lights in our area, called illumination and lights went out. LARP had no friendly casualties.

d. Logistics:

(1) General comment on Brigade's logistical status for the period of May, June, and July. The logistical status of the Brigade has progressively improved during the months of May, June, and July. Early in May the flow of supplies was sparse due to the realignment of our support at Chu Lai. The latter part of June and all of July saw the flow of supplies almost double as critically needed items began to arrive. Generators (10kw) which had been critical until July began to arrive with nine being received and issued to organic units. Lumber, which had been practically nonexistent up until late June, has begun to flow in with nearly three quarters of a million board-feet being issued by the end of July. F Troop 17th Cav received its first issue of mechanized TOE equipment, to include 28-M113 carriers. This issue was not complete and created many shortages based on their new TOE. The biggest problem area faced by the Brigade at this time is the unrealistic order and shipping times we are currently working under. This is caused mainly by the in-country transportation problems. Months pass between the time the item is released for shipment and when it actually arrives at its destination. This problem exist mainly in the area of major end-items.

(2) Supply:

(a) Class I: Figures for May are not available.

1. 1,377,923 "A" Rations issued during June & July.
2. 177,948 Combat Meals issued during June & July.
3. 521,190 Pounds of Potable Ice issued during June & July.
4. 335,502 Pounds of Vegetables issued during June & July.
5. 45,342 Pounds of Fruit issued during June & July.
6. 1,577 Gallons of Ice Cream issued during June & July.

(b) Class II & IV:

1. The list of II & IV items received and issued during this three months covers sixty-two typewritten pages. The most notable includes the issuing of generators, lensatic compasses, construction material and light sets.

2. The items in critical demand are as follows:

Starlight Scopes
BILL items shortages in F Troop
Major items mostly in the 175th Engineer Company
e.g. Dump trucks, scoop loader, and road grader. After the initial receipt

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of items for the conversion of F Troop to a mechanized unit the shortages were listed and requisitioned. They are also now being carried on the Periodic Logistics Report. Follow-ups are made continuously. The 175th Engineer equipment is extremely critical and letters and electronic messages have been sent to the last known source of the requisitions and all indications are the items are now on the way. In at least five instances the Brigade has the Supply Directive number releasing the item for shipment. This is when the transportation problems cause the most trouble. It may be forty-five days or more before the items are received.

(c) During this period we supported the 1/14 Inf Bn. and 2/11th Cav Squadron, which were OPCON to us.

1. Class III:

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Daily Average</u>	<u>Period Total</u>
Diesel	17.6	1590
Mogas	57.6	5190
JP-4	---	---
Avgas	---	---

2. Class V:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Daily Average</u>	<u>Period Total</u>
Shl, Stgun, 12 Gau	----	8350 rds
Ctg, 5.56 Ball	----	1552857 rds
Ctg, 5.56 Tracer	----	181760 rds
Ctg, 7.62 LK 4/1	----	266320 rds
Ctg, 7.62 Ball	----	19200 rds
Ctg, 7.62 LK 4/1	----	61800 rds
Ctg, 7.62 To LKd	----	10400 rds
Ctg, Cal 45 Ball	----	40200 rds
Ctg, Cal 50 4/1	----	110200 rds
Ctg, Cal 50 Sp Tc	----	2860 rds
Ctg, 40mm HE	----	32271 rds
Ctg, 60mm HE	----	860 rds
Ctg, 81 mm HE w/g	----	12801 rds
Ctg, 81mm Illum	----	2059 rds
Ctg, 81mm Smk WP	----	1183 rds
Ctg, 105mm HE w/f	----	49164 rds
Ctg, 105mm HE w/o F	----	23236 rds
Ctg, 105mm HE Illum	----	9220 rds
Ctg, 105mm Smk Green	----	1153 rds
Ctg, 105mm Smk HC	----	670 rds
Ctg, 105mm Smk Red	----	52 rds
Ctg, 105mm Smk WP	----	4922 rds
Ctg, 105mm Smk Yel	----	650 rds
Ctg, 105mm AP BHV w/f	----	72 rds
Ctg, 106mm HEAT	----	770 rds
Ctg, 106mm HEP-T	----	254 rds
Ctg, 4.2" Mortar HE	----	120 rds
Ctg, 4.2" Smk WP	----	40 rds
Ctg, 40mm HE clipped	----	3057 rds
Ctg, 60mm Illum	----	45 rds
Ctg, 81mm HE HE w/o F	----	542 rds
Ctg, 106mm APERS w/fuze	----	90 rds

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<u>Item</u>	<u>Daily Average</u>	<u>Period Total</u>
Chg, Prop 155 GB	----	160 rds
Chg, Prop 155 WB	----	300 rds
Proj, 155 Smk Gn	----	6 rds

(3) Maintenance Services:

(a) Maintenance Activities Received and completed more than twice the number of job orders in the previous reporting period. Equipment in shop awaiting repair has been decreased to almost half the previous level. This improvement of our maintenance posture is due to the slow improvement of the repair parts supply situation. Stockage of repair parts was below 50% zero balance until F Troop received Armored Personnel Carriers. Their new stockage requirements caused the zero balance to go above 50%.

(b) Status of Work Orders:

	<u>Rec'd</u>	<u>Compl</u>	<u>O/H</u>
Wheel Veh	230	226	14
Artillery	77	68	1
Small Arms	501	457	16
Signal	845	646	81
Fire Control	152	149	7
Engr Eqpt	162	144	46
Serv & Evac	380	360	37
Off Mach	102	95	2

(4) Signal Activities:

(a) General: During the period 1 May thru 31 July 1967 maximum effort was put forth establishing, improving, and maintaining the communications within the Brigade Base Camp and to the assigned and attached units of the Brigade. Facilities available for the 196th Brigade Communications included:

(b) Radio:

1. FM: Primary FM nets established within the Brigade included command, intelligence, aviation and aeromedical evacuation (Dust Off). The Brigade also entered Task Force Oregon Cmd, intelligence and Secure Nets.

2. AM: During reporting period the Brigade operated only in two Task Force Nets. TFO Cmd Net #2 (RATT) and 5th Special Forces Nets.

(c) Radio Terminal and Carrier (VHF): Due to the geographical location of the infantry Bns., four 12 channel VHF systems were established between the Brigade CP and each of the four infantry battalion CP's. Channel utilization included 2 common user (CU) circuits from Liberator switchboard to each Bn. switchboard, 1 sole user circuit (SU) from the Brigade to the battalions tactical operations centers and 3 circuits for organic artillery use. An average of 4 circuits were allocated on an as required basis.

(d) Wire: The Brigade telephone system was completely tied in with the Task Force Oregon telephone system and provided telephone service to all military locations within the Republic of Vietnam. Trunk service utilized VHF system almost entirely as metallic long lines could not be installed with any

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degree of maintenance reliability. Wire was used almost exclusively for the local requirements of base camps and within secure areas. The 196th Brigade switchboard (Liberator) used 2 SB-86 boards with two additional Jack Fields TA-207's, giving a capability of 120 circuits, of which an average of 115 were used. Peg count at peak periods, (usually between 0830-1100 and 1400-1630) reaches over the 200 mark putting a considerable strain on the equipment as well as the operators.

(e) Communication Center Service: A 24 hour communication center was established and offered messenger and secure teletype service. Monthly averages of teletype traffic are approximately 300 messages transmitted and 900 messages received. The teletype service is tied in to the world wide network through Task Force Oregon's facilities.

(f) Base Camp Support: The most serious problem encountered by the Communication personnel of the brigade concerned itself with base camp support. All equipment assets have been and are presently being used to provide for base camp communication. In the event the brigade as a whole had to operate from the two locations, e.g. base camp and tactical locations, equipment and systems would have to be provided from outside sources to meet the additional communications requirements. During the reporting period availability of support was extremely limited.

(5) Engineer Activities:

(a) General Comments: The Brigade Engineer Company (175th Engineer Company) conducted support of base camps in ~~constructing~~ roads, nets, lay out of buildings, and technical advice on bunker construction. This engineer company also provided demolition support in destroying enemy tunnels. The engineer company placed concertina wire around tactical bridges north and south of brigade base camps to prevent floating mines from destroying the bridges. A ferry ramp was constructed for 4/31 Inf Bn at the ferry site. The 175th Engineer Company participated in the operation to open up route #1 from Chu Lai South Vietnam to Duc Pho, South Vietnam by providing demolitions teams. Even though the availability of adequate facilities and materials was at times limited, never the less, the 175th Engineer Company accomplished all assigned missions in the allotted time.

(b) Base Camp Support and Development:

1. Number of permanent type buildings completed:

- a. One (1) 16x32 wooden building completed:
- b. One (1) 16x32 cement floor building for 8th support battalion.
- c. One (1) 16x32 concrete floor building for CIO at Ly Tin.
- d. One (1) 10x20 and one (1) 16x32 wood building.
- e. One (1) mess hall building for Generals mess.
- f. Two (2) Orderly room type buildings for 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

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g. One (1) special services stage and one (1) beach house for 196th Light Infantry Brigade 16x40.

2. Number of permanent type buildings under construction and anticipated date of completion:

a. One (1) ea 10x60 concrete floor and a 10x25 concrete floor section for Scout Dog Platoon. No completion date known.

b. One (1) mess hall type building with concrete floor, 16x90. Estimated completion 15 September 1967.

3. Breakdown on materials used:

a. Cement: 3 tons

b. Lumber: 23,500 board feet.

c. Masonite: N/A.

d. Plywood: 245 sheets.

e. Nails: 1850 lbs.

f. Insulation: N/A

4. Roadways:

a. One (1) ea two way laterite road, 5km in length located in 8th Support Battalion area, starting 25 July 67 and completed 28 July 67.

b. One (1) two way laterite road, 5km in length located in 4/31 Inf area, starting 15 May 67 and completion 15 July 67.

5. Potable water total gallons produced: 96,000 gals.

(c) Engineer support of tactical operations: Continuing support of operation Oregon in the form of Construction, mine clearing, water point operations.

(6) Brigade Surgeon:

(a) General Comment on Activities

1. Our medical support at base camp is excellent. We have not as yet encountered any problems during this reporting period. Presently, we have several projects to enhance our base camp support which are only in the planning stages.

2. Medical support on tactical operations has been outstanding. During June and July we encountered a shortage of medical aidmen due to the rotational hump in this period, however, adequate medical support on tactical operations was maintained by borrowing aidmen from our support battalion medical company. In summary, the line units (Companies) have received outstanding medical support.

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(b) Personnel and Supporting Units:

1. Regular medical supplies needed to supply and replenish our medics have been adequate and available for our needs. Our battalion aid stations and supporting medical facilities are doing an excellent job in providing supportive care. Our personnel (medical) are almost up to TO&E strength.

(c) Preventive Med and Health of the Command:

1. Personal Hygiene: Personal hygiene of the command is excellent.

2. Physical condition of the troop is good.

3. Skin and foot diseases are at a minimum. There have been sporadic cases however. Adequate treatment has been administered. This has presented no major medical problem.

4. The fighting strength of the brigade has not been affected by diseases to any noticeable extent.

5. Stat-Analysis of patient hospitalization and evacuation for the period May to July:

Disease	<u>Hospitalized</u>	<u>Evacuated</u>	<u>Total</u>
	840	408	1348
NBI	25	39	64
IRHA	127	196	323

(d) The overall sanitation of the area is excellent. We presently are emphasizing improvement of latrine and mess facilities. Two new reefers (refrigerators) were installed in HHC's mess facilities. All other areas are in excellent condition.

1. All sanitation supplies are on order and are readily available for use.

2. There is an adequate quantity and quality of potable water for the brigade.

3. Our office is presently writing a regulation regarding insect and rodent control. There has been no substantial increase in insect and rodents from the previous reporting period. All units are using rat bait, individual spraying, and stressing individual protection measures for prevention of malaria.

(e) Other Medical Services:

1. Dental Facilities: All dental facilities are adequate and adequate care is provided for the brigade.

2. Veterinarian: The brigade does not have a veterinarian.

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(7) Civil Affairs:

(a) The period 1 May 67 to 31 July 67 showed a great increase in the Brigades' MEDCAP program. This was accomplished by units being situated at several locations throughout the TAOR with MEDCAPS being conducted at company level by company medics. Construction in support of Revolutionary Development has been slow, however, several projects have been completed. Building materials have been in short supply at CORUS.

(b) Civic Actions:

1. MEDCAP: There were 730 MEDCAPS treating 48,031 patients.

2. Community Relations:

a 984 school kits, 412 notebooks, 180 pencils, 270 pounds of clothing, 40 blankets, 40 pillows, 7,200 pounds of food, 86 pounds of candy, 144 gallons of cooking oil were distributed throughout the TAOR.

b Personnel from the 196th Bde conducted 47.5 hours of Spoken English Instruction and attendance was 4376 students. Also there was a total of 8 VN civilians trained in First Aid throughout the AO.

c During this period the 196th Bde completed two schools, two dispensaries, one well, one village office, and one hamlet office, (desks and teaching aids). Current projects include one culvert, two market places, repairing two schools, one dispensary, one new school and a small foot bridge. There has been approximately 10 kms of road built.

(c) Psychological Operations:

1. 8,590,000 leaflets were dropped in support of tactical operations.

2. 66½ hours of loud speaker time was broadcasted.

(8) Public Information:

(a) General Comment on activities

(b) Information Activities

1. Number of printed news releases	98
2. Number of pictorial releases	55
3. Number of Home Town News Releases	1153
4. Number of Home Town Pictorial Releases	13
5. Number of Taped Interviews	33

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6. Number of formal press interviews/briefings 0
2. Number of news media representatives provided 30
- support
8. Major projects produced during this period:

a. Preparation and publication of Brigade Year Book. The 1966 Brigade Year Book was prepared by 1st Lt Ambrosia Sarmiento, Jr., Public Information Officer, Information Office, 196th Lt Inf Bde. Material and/or photo coverage was obtained from the files and news releases of the Brigade during all operations since its arrival in Vietnam. Publisher of the Year Book was the Dai Nippon Printing Co., Ltd. of Tokyo, Japan. The cost of the book to the individual is five dollars (\$5.00). One thousand six hundred and fifty books were ordered. Each book consist of 112 pages of color and black and white photos, items pertaining to the Brigade and it's personnel and a complete list of personnel during this period. Supervision of the lay out and art work for the Year Book was done in Japan by Lt. Sarmiento.

b. Preparation and publication of Brigade Welcome Brochure: Authority was granted by Brigade Headquarters for the Information Office to prepare and publish pertinent information pertaining to the Brigade's history, activities, facilities and a letter of welcome from the Commanding General. The purpose of the brochure is to enable newly arrived replacements to know at the beginning of their tour as much as possible about the Brigade. The ~~brochure~~ is also presented to both civilian and military visitors to the command. The Welcome Brochure was compiled and prepared for publication by Captain Fredrick J. Milton, Information Officer and members of his staff. Two thousand three-color folders were purchased from the Trang-Ky Printing Company, Cholon, Vietnam. All inserts for the brochure were locally produced with the exception of the Brigade patch and special instructions cards required for troop issue.

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2. Commanders Observations and Recommendations

a. Personnel

(1) Item: Infusion of Key Personnel

Discussion: During the rotation hump experienced in May-July 1967, 58% of enlisted personnel and 66% officer personnel in the brigade were replaced, the bulk of these in July. This alone indicated that the infusion program undertaken by the brigade had been less than successful. Of equal importance, 83% of the brigade's key officer personnel were replaced. This figure included all battalion commanders, which could have had a detrimental effect upon operations during the transition period.

Observation: Infusion plans should be designed to ensure continuity of leadership as well as overall personnel continuity.

(2) Item: Assignment instructions for rotating personnel.

Discussion: Large numbers of both officer and enlisted personnel had not received assignment instructions within 30 days of DEROS. It is felt that such non-receipt of assignment instructions was caused primarily by errors in both morning reports and Advance Overseas Returnee roster prepared by this command, which in turn, caused delay by DA in issuing assignment instructions, and misrouting of instructions by Headquarters, USARV. Systems have been instituted and are enforced to correct such errors. Nonetheless, once such errors were discovered, they proved to be difficult to correct through normal administrative channels, and in many cases assignment instructions were obtained only by use of couriers to USARV.

Observation: A continuing, vigorous system of correcting morning report and MOR data will do much to eliminate non-receipts of assignment instructions. However, commanders should recognize that by the time many of these errors are discovered, it will be too late to obtain assignment instructions through normal administrative channels. Plans should be made well in advance of heavy rotation periods to compile lists of individuals without assignment instructions and to convey these lists to USARV by means of regular liaison visits.

b. Operations and training.

(1) Item: Control of Vietnamese boat traffic on Song Tra Bong.

Discussion: Viet Cong have been utilizing waterways for resupply and troop transportation. Due to the large number of boats operating in local waterways, it was relatively simple for the VC to mingle with innocent traffic and conduct logistical and personnel moves.

Observation: A system of numbering all boats according to village of origin was established and these numbers were registered. Local forces, furnished by the District Chief, in conjunction with US Forces, publicized the boat registration program. The local forces then set about

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assigning registration numbers to be printed on the bow of registered boats. All unregistered boats encountered are searched and assigned a registration number. All registered boats that pass through the waterway to the South China Sea are checked and given identification marker. This marker is color coded so that the exact length of stay in the South China Sea may be determined visually. Coordination has been made with US Navy units in the area so that they also know the registration and color coded marking system.

(2) Item: Enforcement of curfew on Vietnamese boat traffic.

Discussion: Viet Cong have been utilizing inland waterways for resupply and troop transportation at night.

Observation: The local populace was informed by the District Chiefs that a strict curfew would be in effect during the hours of 2000 to 0500 on all inland waterways and that all violators of this curfew would be assume to be VC. Following the promulgation of the above, frequent helicopter patrols were begun, using a flare ship and a light fire team at night to enforce the order. Vessels traveling at night in violation of the curfew were destroyed.

(3) Item: Proper engagement of the Viet Cong.

Discussion: The majority of engagements are by the rifleman at short ranges. This has caused riflemen to habitually attempt to engage targets from the hip, the effectiveness of which decreases drastically with increasing range.

Observation: Riflemen have been trained on a combat assault course with targets at various close-in ranges, with the exception of one target at 50 meters. Riflemen engaged close-in targets from the hip with continued good results. However, when the 50 meter target was engaged from the hip, accuracy diminished and the riflemen were corrected on the spot.

(4) Item: Suppression of VC fire from dominant terrain.

Discussion: In certain operations it is necessary to bypass dominant terrain which harbors VC snipers.

Observation: VC sniper fire has effectively been eliminated in such cases by employing CS on the dominant terrain feature.

(5) Item: Detection of Trip Wires.

Discussion: An instructor conducting the mines and booby trap detection courses at the Charger Academy noticed that personnel wearing sunglasses detected far fewer trip wires than those without sunglasses. To test this theory, approximately twelve soldiers negotiated the course, first with sunglasses and without. All participants stated that trip wires were very difficult or impossible to detect while wearing sunglasses, and far less difficult to detect when sunglasses were not worn.

Observation: All commanders took immediate action to inform personnel in their commands of the danger of wearing sunglasses in areas which may contain booby traps.

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(6) Item: Use of M-14 rifles:

Discussion: The enemy sniper uses weapons which have effective ranges up to 500 meters. In order to counter this advantage over the M-16, all LRR'Ps have at least one M-14 rifle with sniper scope. This has resulted so far in two known kills at ranges in excess of 500 meters.

Observation: Each squad should have the capability of engaging the enemy with effective small arms fire at ranges in excess of the M-16. Commanders should insure that they have an adequate number of sniper trained personnel to perform this mission.

(7) Item: Employment of Eagle Flights.

Discussion: It has been found that the use of the tactical Eagle Flight is a fast and efficient way to engage small groups of VC or single snipers, whether they are already engaging friendly units or are spotted from the air or ground.

Observation: An Eagle Flight consists of three troop carrying helicopters and one C&C helicopter. The troop ships carry one officer, two squad leaders and twelve enlisted men. The slicks' primary mission is carrying troops to and from contact with the enemy. When not engaged in carrying troops the slicks' move back to a secure LZ to conserve fuel and increase reaction time. The C&C helicopter serves two purposes; by constantly flying overhead the C&C aids in the decision, and the direction of the fleeing VC and suppresses incoming fire on friendly troops. To be most effective the Eagle Flight troops must be well trained in fire control, fire and movement, and the use of hand and arm signals. The Eagle troops should also be well rehearsed on "soft" or non-tactical targets to increase their efficiency before engaging an organized enemy. Each man in the flight should carry in addition to his basic combat load, four smoke grenades for signalling purposes. The most effective way to engage the enemy is by use of encirclement, i.e. landing the slicks' and troops at three different points around the enemy thus decreasing his chance of escape. It has been found that the Eagle Flight is best utilized at BMNT, 0600-0800H, or just before dusk, 1600-1800H. When used against small villages or hamlets the siesta hours, 1130-1430H, have proven effective.

(8) Item: Quick Fire Range

Discussion: It has been found that in thick underbrush troops have only fleeting glimpses of the enemy at short ranges. The situation then resolves itself into a case of who gets off the first, most accurate shot.

Observation: The 1st Bn, 14th Inf has developed a live fire, moving pop-up range. Troops are retrained in the ability to "snap-shoot" at targets which appear suddenly. Instinctive shooting is incorporated into the marksmanship training.

(9) Item: Unnecessary Losses to Retrieve Casualties.

Discussion: Personnel, to include medical aidmen, should be instructed not to unnecessarily endanger their lives for the sake of rescuing or retrieving a wounded soldier under hostile enemy fire. Such risks

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often result in the unit suffering needless casualties which could be prevented. Also, the death of the wounded soldier may be avoided since he more than likely will not be taken under fire again if he remains calm. The unit must first clear the area before diverting its attention to the wounded. Additionally, leaders will often divert their attention to this matter when all efforts should continue to be concentrated toward directing their units to overcome the enemy.

Observation: One casualty often leads to two, three, or more when efforts are made to retrieve a fallen soldier who is still exposed to hostile fire. Leadership to accomplish the destruction of the enemy is critically interrupted or lost completely if the leader becomes involved in rescuing his wounded and forsakes full attention toward the enemy.

(10) Item: Cordon and search of hamlets:

Discussion: Cordon and detailed search of hamlets for VC, VCS, VC weapons supplies, and equipment have proved to be an effective and necessary tactic to insure control and security of hamlets in assigned AO. In static defensive missions a maximum effort must be made to secure nearby hamlets from VC influence and gain the confidence of the VN nationals.

Observation: It has been found that when an Infantry company cordons and searches a hamlet, they are not fully qualified or trained to effectively determine the status of the VC influence in the hamlet. An infantry company, especially organized for searches, can with training find VC weapons, supplies, and equipment physically located within the search area. They are not totally trained to question the VN people as to VC influence or determine the status of those questions concerning ID cards, black lists, and family history. Even with the attached VN interpreter there is not usually true exchange of information. We have found that with the help of Military Intelligence, CI teams, national police, an interpreter familiar with the hamlet, and the hamlet chief accompanying the CI teams, a complete check of the status of the VN people in the village may be determined. The infantry company can provide a most effective cordon of a hamlet and provide local security, as required for the search teams. The attached medics, from the infantry company, can provide a MEDCAP in conjunction with the search, when provided with a 3/4 ton truck and special items of medical supplies as well as soap, clothing and candy.

(11) Item: wiring of Booby Traps/Mines.

Discussion: On a recent airmobile Operation, a unit moved to a permanent structure upon embarking. Near the structure, mines exploded and, upon investigation, the platoon leader discovered that all the mines in the area were connected in series with a lead wire extending 400 to 500 meters away from the area.

Observation: A unit should be well dispersed upon approaching permanent structures that have been previously used by US troops. With the possibility of command detonations from such a far distance, coupled with mines and booby traps connected in a series, the leader must always be cognizant of maximum dispersion.

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(12) Item: Use of Starlight Scope in conjunction with search light.

Discussion: Recently one of our units experimenting with the search light, noticed difficulty in obtaining a precise, detailed view of the area. One man, however, using a starlight had excellent success.

Observation: When using a search light, employ the starlight to the areas on the flanks of the beam. Excellent reception of targets in the area is possible. However, the starlight, used directly in the beam offers no positive results.

(13) Item: Road Clearing Operations.

Observation: From past experience we know that the daily routine of clearing a road can become boring. This definitely causes a lackadaisical attitude, which tends to breed poor security and a feeling of safety. The VC observe these actions and when they feel the unit has let down its guard will strike and cause friendly casualties.

Discussion: All road clearing units must maintain a well spread-out formation; maintain communications with other friendly and enemy positions and above all alertness to the basic principles of road clearing, likely ambush must be "eyeballed" and physically checked. Dispersion and good firing positions must be taken up during halts. Needless casualties will be taken unless these basic rules are followed.

(14) Item: Detection of Booby-Traps.

Discussion: The detection of booby-traps depends largely upon the alertness and watchfulness of the individual. We have lately experienced a considerable number of CBU bomblets that have been buried and fused with a pressure detonating device. This type booby-trap is especially difficult to detect since it does not have a trip wire attached and is buried so that the naked eye will not see it.

Observation: An effective way to detect this type mines is to employ the mine detector as a part of the point team. The procedure may be somewhat slow at times but buried AP mines are detected.

(15) Item: Detection of booby-trap in hedgerows.

Discussion: It has been found that the VC will booby-trap openings in hedgerows. The two favorite types are the trip-wire type booby-trap or a hand grenade with pin pulled, lodged loosely in a tree or bush. The enemy has also blocked several other openings in the hedgerows leaving only the booby-trapped one open. The other openings are blocked with shrubbery.

Observation: An effective way to detect these booby-traps is with either a grappling hook (3 metal rods curved on the end and attached to a rope) or a tin can filled with cement and also attached to a rope. Throw either one of these items through the opening and pull back. This will usually cause the booby-traps to detonate. This is time-consuming, but saves lives and prevents injuries.

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(16) Items: Artillery Operations on beach and sandy areas.⁴

Discussion: Operation in beach areas, loose sand and near large bodies of water can have many effects upon a firing unit particularly during airmobile operations. Some of the effects are:

(a) All exposed surfaces of howitzers must be securely covered during lift and resupply due to loose sand being blown about. The residue is large grain sand and not just dust as experienced in the past.

(b) Materials for constructing a platform base for the howitzer must be taken with the battery as the displacement obtained from firing on loose sand is much too great.

(c) During resupply, consideration should be given to resupply by a platoon concept and if possible using natural obstacles such as sand dunes to shield one platoon from the wind effects of the resupply effort on the other platoon. Firing during such resupply operations is impossible without some type of obstacle separating the platoons. Ammunition must be dropped at or very near the howitzer as the physical fatigue of man handling ammunition in deep loose sand is great.

(d) Reserve or reaction forces should be assembled on high ground as the fatigue encountered in moving through knee deep loose sand hinders the performance of the force upon deployment.

(e) Firing on loose sand causes a rippling effect of the sand which makes it necessary to use some type of reinforcement for parapets. Digging in loose sand is out of the question as the sand merely rolls back into place. All fortifications must be constructed from the ground up.

(f) The temperature at times reaches 130 degrees F. which affects crew performance as well as causing large deviations in corrections for powder temperatures. Maximum effort should be made to store all ammo in the same manner to get the same temperature.

(g) Lift capability of CH-47 is reduced due to extreme heat and nearness to a large body of water. Lifts should be programmed for early morning in order to get maximum efficiency of CH-47.

(17) Items: Residue from illumination rounds.

Discussion: There is quite a bit of residue from the 105/155mm illumination round which will fall anywhere from a point directly beneath the point of base ejection or on the trajectory extended.

Observation: FDC must take extreme caution to insure that base ejection does not take place over friendly troops or that the trajectory extended does not go over friendly troops in order to preclude injury from residue.

(18) Items: Operating against enemy snipers.

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Discussion: In the past, when operating against enemy snipers, the patrol leader would break a patrol down into two and possibly three teams, assign areas and then begin to search. In addition, blocking forces would be placed strategically throughout the area in the event that the patrol would flush the enemy.

Observation: Based on experience while operating in AO Leopard, this method has proven ineffective due to the enemy's knowledge of the terrain, his ability to react quickly and elude friendly patrols. Although reaction time, to the area of fire, is the key to success in operations such as these, it is also important to obtain a large area coverage in a short period of time. This has been accomplished by setting up a patrol CP and sending three man teams, in a 360 degree radius for X numbers of meters, depending upon terrain and weather conditions.

(19) Item: Track commanders seats and supports--M113.

Discussion: Track commanders seats and supports are adjustable; however these items have been found to be burdensome and space consuming.

Observation: By removing the seats and placing a simple board across the track commanders hatch, several problems have been eliminated: (1) The elevated seat places the commander in a better position to effectively fire the 50 Cal Machine Gun, (2) The track commander also has quicker access to the ammo and radio, (3) There is more room for ammo storage, (4) In the event that the track hits a mine, the TC is blown clear of the vehicle and not trapped in the hatch, and finally, (5) The elevated seat affords the TC an improved field of vision.

(20) Item: Gun shields for M113 Armored Personnel Carriers.

Discussion: At present F Troop, 17th Cavalry is operating without gun shields for the M113. Although this equipment is on requisition, we have been informed that these shields will not be available until late September or early October.

Observation: The OEM for the tracks should include gun shields. This would preclude having to conduct combat operations without complete equipment.

(21) Item: Removal of shrouds from the M113.

Discussion: Because of the rough terrain in this area, the rubber shrouds which are utilized in swimming operations have a tendency to become torn and mutilated.

Observation: To preserve this equipment they have been removed and stored. Should future operation require the use of shrouds they will be in perfect condition and may be attached to the track in a matter of minutes.

(22) Item: Movement of 105 battery by CH-47.

Discussion: None

Observation: Three persons must be used to insure proper hook up of water trailers and preclude twisting and snagging of slings on

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fenders and water pipes. Emergency procedures must be established for hook up man to exit a load in event of mechanical failure of aircraft. For instance, all hook up men will face aircraft head on and will exit to right, and aircraft will move to its right. Call signs must be set and adhered to in LZ and PZ as use of more than one call sign causes confusion in establishing the location of the individual. Colored helmet liners or vests help in distinguishing loads and hook up personnel. Keep all extraneous personnel out of LZ and PZ to reduce confusion in identifying loads, hook-up men, and as a safety measure in event of mechanical failure of a/c. Personnel operating radio in LZ and PZ should use headset to insure constant commo. Smoke grenades should be fired in holes to prevent fires.

(23) Item: Demolition Teams

Discussion: During S&D operations an infantry company is often confronted with the problem of destroying numerous tunnels, bunkers, and trees. Company commanders have had success with appointing three or four-man teams with a general knowledge and aptitude for demolition. The teams are kept together as a unit and the demolition equipment is always present to do the job. The special demolition team should always personally carry all equipment and material necessary for any mission with the exception of the C4 itself, which should be carried by each rifle squad. Through repetitive experience, the squad may approach or surpass the effectiveness of a trained engineer squad. Individual squad members of other squads must however, continue to be well trained in demolitions to serve as a backup when needed.

Observation: Specially trained demolitions teams within each platoon to handle the employment of explosives and to train the other members of the platoon in the use of explosives is more effective than attempting to divide the demolitions responsibility too widely.

c. Intelligence:

(1) Item: Verification of information gained thru interrogation by visual reconnaissance.

Discussion: In the past reliability could not be determined in some instances for information gained thru interrogation of captives, detainees or returnees on hard installations. Now, by the use of Aerial Observers flying reconnaissance missions we are able to determine the creditability of targets provided by interrogations. This calls for coordination with the II Section to schedule flights over areas pointed out by map tracking sources as to locations of VC strong points, tunnels, bunkers, rice and weapons caches, and other hard installations. The exact locations of hard installations can be determined when given the area to observe in an approximate location.

Observation: Deploying this method we have been able to plot and recommend targets for air and artillery strikes.

(2) Item: Time involved in preparing mosaics.

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Discussion: The II Section produces a large number of mosaics monthly of the same area for different units. The time required to prepare these mosaics as well as the time involved awaiting reprints is considerable.

Observation: Mosaics of the 196th Lt Inf Bde TAOR are made in a 20' X 24' format and reproduced at the 467th Recce Tac in Ton Son Nhut. By this means the II Section eliminates re-ordering the photo mission, reduces by half the man-hours required to make individual mosaics, and is better able to support the ground commander by having mosaics on hand.

(3) Item: Concentrations of agent reports & incidents.

Discussion: Formerly it was believed that statistics on enemy initiated incidents were among the most valid indicators of enemy activity. However, experience has shown that most incidents which are recorded are enemy initiated in response to friendly activity. Thus, they tend to show patterns of friendly rather than enemy activity. Agent reports, on the other hand, do show patterns of enemy activity, but the veracity of most of the agents reports is to be doubted. The area of greatest enemy activity may be located where concentrations of agent reports and incidents are located together.

Observation: Corresponding concentrations of agent reports and of incidents are better indications of enemy activity than concentrations of agent reports or incidents individually.

(4) Item: Harbor Site Confirmation.

Discussion: In the past, committed LRP teams have verified their location using terrain analysis, in conjunction with compass for direction and pace cord for distance for distance measurements in movement from a known location. Results have varied, and the precise location information required to call in defensive artillery hasn't always been immediately available. Consequently, before fire for effect could be instituted, an elaborate 400 meter height of burst with WP position verification had to be carried out.

Observation: Teams that positively verify their positions before darkness with distant marking rounds, have a greatly reduced artillery usage reaction time.

(5) Item: LRP Team integrity.

Discussion: Personnel going on R & R, special and emergency leave and to the hospital have disrupted the previous six man team organization to a point where team strength figures often stood at five, and occasionally at four. The present LRP team organization has been changed to seven members, with R & R and leaves programmed to keep operational strength for each team at six individuals.

Observation: Using this modified manpower allocation system, less disruption of the necessarily cohesive teams has taken place. The six individuals going on patrol in each case are from a personnel pool of seven individuals and are consequently well acquainted with each other.

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(6) Item: The tactical employment of Chieu Hoi's (Hoi Chans).

Discussion: On Operation Benton, a temporary detainee cage was utilized. The function of this cage was merely to hold detainees long enough for initial screening to determine their disposition. Many detainees held Chieu Hoi passes, and demonstrated an eagerness to cooperate with the interrogators. Several Hoi Chans volunteered to accompany the ground units in order to point out VC personnel and installations. This method brought about the capture of several VC and destruction of two tunnel complexes.

Observation: This illustrates that proper utilization of detainees and Hoi Chans can be of great tactical value.

(7) Item: Enemy Sniper employment.

Discussion: During the period covered by this report, the enemy used a new tactic of employing snipers in depth, with booby traps on likely approaches.

Observation: Individual platoons were broken down into fire teams and were employed within close supporting distance of each other. This technique insured maximum area coverage while minimizing the probability of exposure of enemy fire. Artillery was placed on likely sniper areas and on the flanks of the platoon. The element in contact then used fire and movement to close with the enemy. Two additional fire teams protected the flanks of the base of fire and maneuver elements.

(8) Item: Enemy Anti-helicopter Tactics:

Discussion: US Units are almost entirely dependent upon the helicopter for resupply; therefore, the volume of helicopter traffic in enemy infested areas is quite heavy. Numerous documents captured by this organization have contained extensive training material on techniques of shooting helicopters with small arms. The enemy will watch as the helicopter goes into a US position and move to a good firing position along the final approach to the LZ. He will select a position that will give him a good shot when the chopper is on its final approach and is most vulnerable to ground fire. The enemy position is often several hundred meters from the LZ making counter fire by small arms difficult.

Observation: Saturating the approach to the LZ with fire team size patrols allows effective interdiction of enemy movement and provides a quick reaction force to enemy fire. The 1-14 Inf had enemy kills on three different occasions during the reporting period by employing this technique. When employing such a technique, the helicopter pilots are advised of friendly locations to preclude the engagement of friendly troops by door-gunners. The ground commanders advise the pilot to approach the LZ along the route that has been secured. When it is impractical to employ such patrols, the ground commanders advise the pilot to vary his flight patterns leading to the LZ. Regardless of the tactic employed, the ground commander must always brief the pilot on the friendly and enemy situations and advise him of the safest approach to the LZ.

(9) Item: Deliberately building fires and firing around

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friendly locations at night.

Discussion: The enemy is often aware of the general night locations of US units. A tactic he has employed is to fire several automatic weapon burst at a safe distance from US positions and build fires. This will usually result in artillery fire being called into the area, and a subsequent search by American troops at first light. The enemy will then employ booby traps and snipers along the most likely route that a unit will travel when leaving the bivouac site, and will patiently wait until morning when friendly troops move out on daily operations.

Observation: (a) Avoid trails and open areas when leaving bivouac sites.

(b) Be especially alert during all movements.

(c) Move from bivouac in direction away from the objective, then circle around.

(d) Recon by fire with organic and indirect fire weapons prior to and during movement.

(e) Conduct all movement using the best tactical formation and all around security.

(10) Item: Aerial Reconnaissance.

Discussion: Aerial reconnaissance of a proposed area of operations is extremely valuable; however, extreme caution must be exercised so that VC-VCS in the area are not forewarned by unusual air activity. This is particularly true in our present AO, where no fixed VC installations are present.

Observation: During the conduct of checkmate type operations in the battalion AO, aerial reconnaissance has in some cases drastically reduced normal movement by Vietnamese. Thus, the normal desire to become as familiar as possible with a proposed area of operation must be balanced against the necessity to keep our intentions unknown to the VC.

d. Logistics:

(1) Item: Failure of units to pick-up ice at the Class I point with an appropriate type vehicle.

Discussion: At present the brigade is receiving approximately 8500 lbs of ice from TFO. After consideration is given to heat and the time element of units picking up the ice, a loss of 25% or 2000 lbs of ice takes place. The majority of units have been picking up ice in vehicles which had no over-head cover and floors which were not palletized and clean resulting in the ice melting at an abnormal rate.

Observation: All units should insure that vehicles picking up ice have over-head covering and that the floor of the vehicle is clean and palletized prior to pick up.

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e. Civil Affairs.

(1) Item: Water Supply During Refugee Relocation.

Discussion: Adequate, potable water is essential in preparing an area to accept relocated Vietnamese Nationals. Planning should include the investigation of existing water sources and if necessary the preparation of additional sources. Water supplies must be confirmed potable by technical personnel. The absence of adequate, potable water in the area necessitates increased logistical requirements, equipment and personnel to procure, transport and dispense water. The practical and psychological value of properly supporting a relocation is essential. Water is one very important factor.

Observation: Special staff personnel must be consulted. Staff supervision to insure on-site, potable water sources prior to any relocation is a must.

(2) Item: Limited Inventories of Civic Action Construction Materials.

Discussion: Military CA projects must be of a short term, high impact nature. It is paramount that projects undertaken be completed and in the shortest time possible. In keeping with the theme of "helping the people help themselves", sponsoring units must insure an adequate supply of materials from start to finish. Prolonged delay or uncompleted projects result in an unfavorable impression on the part of the Vietnamese and do more harm than if the project had not been undertaken. The approach of "stock-piling" CA materials is contrary to the stated supply support of Civil Affairs. However, in view of the fact that the availability of necessary supplies is often intermittent and unpredictable, the establishment of limited inventories would preclude situations conceivably of irreparable harm to the overall psychological objectives of Civil Affairs. In addition, Civic Action Imprest Funds should be used more extensively to preclude the development of these undesirable situations.

Observation: The undesirable results of incomplete Military Civic Action projects can be precluded to a greater degree. Proper planning, the establishment of limited construction material inventories by the sponsoring unit prior to project initiation, and more extensive use of Civic Action Imprest Funds will greatly alleviate the situation.

(3) Item: The Battalion Medical Civic Action Program.

Discussion: Med Cap activities in the Battalions are conducted in two ways. First, the daily care of illness and injury in secure hamlets by company medics. Secondly, Battalion Med Cap operations conducted in conjunction with company and Battalion sized operations. It has been found that a more efficient and more productive method is to combine the medical activity with a tactical operation, i.e. search and seal. In this manner, the operation provides the necessary forces for population control and security of the medical team. An added advantage is that the civic actions blunts the hostility intrinsic to the tactical action.

Observation: The search and seal operation is conducted in the usual manner with commencement shortly after BMNT lasting until approximately 0900H. As part of this operation, a structure is located which has limited

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access, is close to a large shaded area, and central to the hamlets. This building is carefully covered by mine detection devices, as is an adjacent clearing suitable for an LZ. At this point, a medical team is transported to the area. The four man med cap team consists of a MC officer (Battalion Surgeon), Clinical Technician (91C20), and two aid men from the battalion aid station (91A10). Additional medical personnel are drawn from the medics indigenous to the company or platoon conducting the tactical activity. In addition, one or two members of the S5 team of the battalion accompanies the medical group to supply literature, candy, soap, clothes etc. Practical considerations contributing to the success of the med cap are: (1) crowd control. The entrance to the building utilized for treatment is restricted. Supplemental restriction may be provided by concertina wire. The crowd gravitates to the area by shade, water, S5 gifts and the natural end of the clearing operation. The people should not be forced to seek medical care to obtain the gifts as this increases the load of patients without measurably benefiting the community. (2) Drug control: Drugs, soap etc. should be repackaged or the original package marked to prevent sale of these items through black market channels. Quantity limits are determined by the illness plus the consideration that any large identifiable amounts make the patient to whom they are given a target for VC terror in order to obtain the medication for treatment of their forces. This benefits neither the patient nor US Army. (3) Follow up is facilitated by the utilization of the company medics who are located permanently near the village. The people are then not forced to travel all the way to the battalion base camp and the medics judgement is heightened by prior knowledge and the judgement of the physician accompanying the original treatment team. (4) Supplies: should include necessary medical equipment and sufficient water for dressing and consumption by patients (15 Gal). (5) Interpreter: An interpreter is absolutely necessary and should be transported with the medical team. For control purposes and additional interpreter may be provided by the company conducting the operation.

Conclusion: Joining the medical civic action program with tactical operations provides a more efficient use of personnel (security force), a greater unity of civic action programs so that the community realizes their joint usefulness to them, a higher level of medical care since more frequent activity can be performed without waiting for a break in the tactical operations to allow civic action and unification of medical, S5, and tactical groups in the battalion thus providing more understanding of their mutual problems.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. W. CUNNINGHAM
2LT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- D plus
- 10 - Bde Historian
- 1 - Item 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 37, 40, 41, 43, & 44.

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3 - ACofS for Force Dev, DA
5 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVC-DH
3 - Mr. MacDonald, Dept Ch Mil Hist DA
2 - CG, Human Research Unit, Ft Benning, Ga
3 - CG, US Army Inf Sch, Ft Benning, Ga
3 - CG, US Army Armor Sch, Ft Knox, Ky
3 - CG, US Army Artillery and Missile Sch, Ft Sill, Okla
3 - CG, C/GS, Ft Leavenworth, Kan
3 - CG, IFFORCEV, ATTN: ACofS, G3
3 - CG, 1st Cav Div, APO 96490
3 - CG, 199th Lt Inf Bde, APO 96279
3 - CG, 173rd Abn Bde, APO 96250
3 - CG, 1st Inf Div, APO 96345
3 - CG, 4th Inf Div, APO 96262
3 - CG, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, APO 96247
3 - CG, 9th Inf Div, APO 96370
5 - CG, Americal Div, ATTN: Historian, APO 96374
3 - CINUSARPAC, ATTN: G-3, APO 96557

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AVHGC-DST (22 Sep 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 July 1967.
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 4 DEC 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters, has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for quarterly period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 196th Light Infantry Brigade (SEP) (FBEA), ~~as indicated~~.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning equipment, page 3, paragraph 4a(2): Non-concur. The machines in question, which were probably station property deployed as TAT, are like any others which require daily preventive maintenance and the use of dust covers when not actually in use. Periodic servicing is required and is available from DS maintenance units.

b. Reference item concerning MTOE for 196th Light Infantry Brigade and reorganization of F Troop, 17th Cavalry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, page 8, paragraph (6)(c) 1 and 2. MTOE's for some units in the brigade have been received. They have been staffed and many returned to the unit for standardization. This is a continuing program which will receive emphasis during the implementation of the TAADS (The Army Authorization Documents System) program. Reference the lack of a General Order to complete the administrative reorganization of F Troop, 17th Cavalry. This headquarters prepared and forwarded the MTOE for this organization to USARPAC on 26 May 1967 requesting expeditious processing. USARPAC message GPOP-L 15241 DTG 190102Z May 67 gave concurrence to request to reorganize and further requested DA to implement reorganization. USARV message AVHGC-FD 69457 dated 22 October 1967 has been dispatched to USARPAC and DA ACSFOR requesting status and expeditious handling.

c. Reference item concerning logistics, page 20, paragraph d(1): Non-concur. The transportation system is responsive in meeting required delivery dates, and in-country order and ship times are being reduced as better techniques are employed in handling requisitions. Complaint results from time required to obtain the item rather than from lack of responsiveness in the transportation system.

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AVHGC-DST (22 Sep 67)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending ¹30 July 1967.
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

d. Reference item concerning items in critical demand, page 20, paragraph d(2)(b) 2: Concur. Scoop Loaders, trucks and graders are in short supply, but action is being taken to expedite delivery from CONUS. Lift data has been received on graders.

e. Reference item concerning infusion of key personnel, page 28, paragraph 2a(1): Concur. A vigorous command effort must be maintained at all levels to insure that infusion of units takes place. If a reduction of the rotational hump can not be effected by the unit concerned, the problem must be referred to the next higher headquarters where assistance can be rendered. Under the USARV controlled infusion plan, all major subordinate unit commanders must report all battalion sized units and separate companies which have not been infused as required by USARV Reg 614-9. Those units that can be infused by the major subordinate command will be so indicated, and those that can not be infused by local actions will be infused from USARV resources by USARV.

f. Reference item concerning gunshields, page 34, paragraph 2b(20): Nonconcur. Gunshields are a special authorization under MTOE and are not universally required as OEM for APC's. All appropriate actions have been taken to expedite receipt of shields.

g. Reference item concerning assignment instructions for rotating personnel, page 28, paragraph 2a(2): Concur.

(1) This headquarters makes every possible effort to obtain a firm unit of assignment for each individual departing this command.

(2) Since the end of the reporting period, this headquarters has instituted procedures to provide each major commander with machine prepared assignment instruction listings or sequentially numbered assignment instruction letters for individuals assigned to his command. Each commander is also furnished a listing of those individuals for whom assignment instructions have not been received 30-60 days prior to the beginning of DEROS month for verification and return. These listings provide for closer control of these personnel and identify individuals on whom special attention should be focused by DA, this headquarters, and the major commander. Liaison visits to this headquarters are encouraged in order to iron out the most difficult problems encountered.

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AVHGC-DST (22 Sep 67)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30¹ July 1967.
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

3. ORLL was received without 1st Indorsement. Efforts are being made to obtain the indorsement. It will be forwarded, through channels, upon receipt by this headquarters.

4. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. Nakatsukasa
C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

cc:

HQ, 196th Light Infantry Brigade

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GPOP-DT(22 Sep 67)

2d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
from HQ, 196th Lt Inf Bde (UIC: WFBAAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)


HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 12 JAN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. The MTOE referred to in paragraph 2b, 2d Indorsement was
forwarded to DA for approval on 15 June 1967. By paragraph 1e,
message 838755, DA indicated that every effort was being made to
expedite approval.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



HEAVRIN SNIDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
TOE 17-57-G

TAB-B



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CHARGER ACADEMY
196th Light Infantry Brigade
APO San Francisco 96256

SUBJECT: TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR EM

28 July 1967

1st Day	Time	Subject	Instructor	Location
	0730-0800	Group Ldr Insp & Roll call	TBA	TBA
	0800-0820	Orientation	"	"
	0830-0900	Chaplins Orientation	"	"
	0900-0950	Bde History	"	"
	1000-1050	Enemy & Friends S-2	"	"
	1100-1130	Air Mobility	"	"
	1300-1420	First Aid	"	"
	1440-1550	Bunkerline Duty	"	"
	1600-1630	Military Justice	"	"
	1630-1700	Code of Conduct	"	"
	1700-1715	Police call of Area	"	"
	1830-2100	Special Equipment	"	"
2nd Day	0730-1130	Map & Compass & Pacing	"	"
	1300-1330	Civil Affairs & Chieu Hoi Program S-5	"	"
	1400-1450	Arty Orientation	"	"
	1500-1530	Scout Dogs Flt.	"	"
	1530-1600	Rules of Engagement	"	"
	1630-1700	P.I.O.	"	"
	1700-1715	Police of Area	"	"
3rd Day	0730-0930	Lecture VC Mines & Traps	"	"
	0930-1700	Grp#1 0930-1130 Booby Trap Reaction Range	"	"
		Grp#2 1300-1500 Mine sweeping course	" Rotate every 2 hrs- 3	"
		Grp#3 1500-1700 Demolition	" equal group "	"
4th Day	0730-0820	Patrolling	"	"
	0930-1020	Combat Patrols	"	"
	1030-1120	Ambush	"	"
	1300-1630	Practical Exercise	"	"
	1630-1645	Police of Area	"	"
	1730-0600	Bunkerline Duty NCOIC	"	"
5th Day	0730-0820	M-60	"	"
	0830-0920	XM48, M-79	"	"
	0930-1050	M-16	"	"
	1100-1130	Grenades	"	"
	1300-1430	PRC-25 & Procedures	"	"
	1500-1630	Prep Field Fortifications & Night Firing Technique	"	"
	1630-1645	Police of Area	"	"
	1800-1850	Claymore Mine	"	"
	1900-2000	Reaction Range	"	"
	2000-2100	Night Firing	"	"

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TAB C

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CHARGER ACADEMY
SCOUT SNIPER SCHOOL
196th Light Infantry Bde
APO San Francisco 96256

SUBJECT: Sniper Training Schedule

<u>DAY</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
1st	0730-0930	Mission of Sniper	Classroom
	0930-1130	Position & dry firing	Range
	1230-1430	Range Determination	Range
	1430-1630	Early fire & zero	Range
	1800-1830	Dry firing	Range
2nd	0730-0930	Map Reading	Classroom
	0930-1130	Selection routes to sniper position	Classroom
	1230-1430	Radio Telephone Procedure	Classroom
	1430-1630	Firing using different positions	Range
	1800-1830	Dry firing	Range
3rd	0730-1130	Firing known distance 300-400-500-600-700 meters	Range
	1230-1330	Mental Conditioning	Classroom
	1330-1430	Effects of weather	Classroom
	1430-1530	Data Book, Sniper log, and Range Card	Classroom
	1530-1630	Artillery Orientation	Classroom
	1800-1830	Dry firing	Range
4th	0730-0930	Selection of positions and Camouflage	Classroom & Range
	0930-1130	Mines, Booby Traps	Classroom
	1230-1330	Sniper teams & their employment	Classroom & Range
	1330-1430	Leads on moving targets & held off	Classroom & Range
	1430-1630	Day Zero of Starlight Scope	Classroom & Range
	1730-2100	Practice fire using starlight & fire M-84 scope using flares	Range
5th	0730-1630	Field fire course, reaction course & moving target course Observation by teams for enemy	Range
6th	0730-1630	Combat Operation	Combat Unit

TAB "D"

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continued:

<u>6th Day</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Instructor</u>	<u>Location</u>
	0730-0820	M-60, XM148, M-79	TBA	TBA
	0830-0950	Zero	"	"
	1000-1045	Grenade Live Application	"	"
	1100-1130	Fire conformation Zero & Auto	"	"
	1130-1145	Police of Range	"	"
	1145-1200	Question & Answer Period & Graduation	"	"

TBA - To Be Announced

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Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
<i>(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)</i>		
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		2b. GROUP
		4
3. REPORT TITLE		
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Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 July 1967		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)		
CG, 196th Light Infantry Brigade		
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